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Abstract	Investments	(FDI)	have	become	more	connected	to	the	global	value	chains	(GVCs)	in	the	past	decated.	As	known,	 the	Visegrád	countries	 intensively	participate	 in	GVCs	and	have	collected	considerable	stock	of	FDI.	 	The	purpose	of	 the	paper	 is	 to	analyse	how	governmental	 investment	promotion	policies	of	 these	countries	 reacted	 to	 these	phenomena.	 Investment	 can	be	promoted	 in	a	wide	 sense	–	 creating	 stabile	business	environment	–	and	in	a	narrow	sense	(grants,	tax	allowances,	etc).	Narrow	sense	FDI	incentives	serve	 in	 most	 cases	 large	 multinationals.	 The	 Visegrád	 countries	 have	 applied	 several	 type	 of	 state	incentives	 on	 a	 large	 scale.	 Based	 on	 official	 data	 and	 press	 information	 we	 provide	 insight	 into	 the	narrow	sense	FDI	promotion	steps,	from	grants	to	special	industrial	zones.	Using	 international	 surveys	and	 indices	we	show	that	 several	 factors	 that	 favourable	 for	FDI	 in	a	wide	sense,	 have	deteriorated	 recently.	 Legal	 stability	 has	been	 shaken,	 corruption	 increased	 and	 education	indices	 declined.	 The	 shortage	 of	 qualified	 labour	 force	 became	 acute.	 Visegrád	 countries	 continue	competing	for	large	investments,	therefore	costly,	tailored	grants	for	foreign	firms	(narrow	tools)	will	be	more	and	more	 important.	However,	 this	 cannot	endlessly	compensate	 for	worsening	business	climate	(wide	tools).	
JEL	Codes:	F13,	F14,	P52	
Keywords:	global	value	chains,	FDI,	state	aid 	
	
Introduction	During	 the	 last	 decade	 in	 the	 world	 economy	 investment	 and	 trade	 within	 global	value	chains	(GVCs)	has	become	even	more	intensive	than	before.	As	known,	firms	of	the	Visegrád	 region	 are	 producing	 and	 exporting	 within	 these	 global	 production	 chains	
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 (Éltető,	 2015,	 Antalóczy	 and	 Éltető,	 2016).	 Multinational	 companies	 of	 mainly	automotive	 and	 electronic	 GVCs	 invested	 heavily	 in	 this	 region	 since	 the	 nineties.	Foreign	 Direct	 Investment	 (FDI)	 and	 trade	 is	 thus	 strongly	 interconnected	 in	 these	countries	and	because	of	this,	incentives	for	FDI	promote	also	exports.	Investment	 can	 be	 supported	 by	 several	 measures.	 Promotion	 of	 foreign	 direct	investment	can	aim	not	only	new	investments	but	also	expansion	of	existing	capacities,	reinvested	earnings.	We	can	speak	about	investment	stimuli	in	a	narrow	sense	and	in	a	
wide	sense	(Antalóczy	and	Sass,	2000).		Investment	promotion	in	a	wide	sense	means	the	attractiveness	 of	 a	 country	 and	 its	 economic	 policies,	 like	monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policy,	budgetary	system,	structural	policy	such	as	labour	market	policy	and	education.	“Doing	business”,	 regulatory	 conditions	 and	 infrastructure	 can	 also	 influence	 the	 opinion	 of	entrepreneurs.	Favourable	business	environment	factors	concern	both	large	and	smaller	firms.	Investment	incentives	in	a	narrow	sense	can	be	first	tax	allowances	(from	profit	tax,	customs	 duties,	 contributions	 for	 several	 years).	 A	 second	 group	 consists	 of	 financial	incentives	 (grants,	 local	 allowances)	 and	 the	 third	 group	 includes	 other	 investment	benefits,	for	example	infrastructure,	services,	technical	help,	training.	Countries	compete	for	 foreign	 investments	with	 these	 “narrow”	 incentives	and	 this	 can	have	positive	and	negative	effects	(Oman,	2011).	Theoretically	these	measures	refer	to	all	investors,	but	in	practice	large	foreign	companies	benefited	from	them	in	the	Visegrád	region.	In	the	four	Visegrád	 countries	 generous	 grants	 have	 been	 provided	 as	 investment	 incentives,	mostly	 targeted	 to	multinational	 investors.	 Apart	 from	 this,	 tax	 exemptions	 and	 other	benefits	have	been	assured,	often	bound	to	special	investment	zones,	industrial	parks,	as	it	is	described	in	this	paper.		
Foreign	Direct	Investment	in	the	Visegrád	countries	FDI	 in	 a	 country	 is	 registered	 in	 the	 Balance	 of	 Payments,	 given	 by	 statistics	 of	National	Banks.	 FDI	 consists	of	 three	parts:	 	equity	 and	other	owner	 share,	 reinvested	earnings	and	other	capital	(mainly	intercompany	loans).	In	the	last	decade	registration	of	 FDI	 became	more	 and	more	 problematic	 in	 several	 countries	 (Antalóczy	 and	 Sass,	
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 2015).	 In	 the	 mid-2000	 years	 for	 example	 the	 activity	 of	 “Special	 Purpose	 Entities”	increased.	The	primary	 task	of	SPEs	 is	 to	execute	 transactions	 for	 tax	optimization	 for	their	 parent	 foreign	 company,	 they	 have	 no	 ties	 to	 local	 economy.	 Similarly,	 after	 the	crisis	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 “capital	 in	 transit”	 appeared	 in	 large	 volumes,	 that	 is	 a	transaction	within	 a	 company	group	 (linked	 through	ownership),	 transiting	 through	a	given	 economy	without	 affecting	 it	 (OECD,	 2008,	 157).	 Among	 the	 Visegrád	 countries	only	the	Hungarian	National	Bank	provides	FDI	data	“cleaned”	from	SPEs	and	capital	in	transit	(Montvai,	2015)4	and	the	Polish	National	Bank	publishes	SPE-free	FDI	data	since	20145.	In	 some	 cases,	multinationals	 invest	 in	 a	 country	 through	 permanently	 established	foreign	affiliates	or	 through	established	SPEs	 intermediaries	 in	 third	countries.	This	 is	called	 indirect	 FDI	 (Kalotay,	 2012).	 In	 these	 case	 the	 nationality	 of	 the	 immediate	investor	and	the	ultimate	owner	is	different.	The	reasons	for	indirect	investments	can	be	various	(Aykut	et	al.	2017).	In	some	cases,	the	intention	might	be	to	conceal	the	identity	of	 the	ultimate	 investor.	Several	 times	domestic	capital	 is	 channelled	 through	offshore	centres	to	the	local	economy	in	the	form	of	direct	investment	(round	tripping)	so	foreign	investment	is	not	even	foreign.	Having	 these	 statistical	distortions	 in	mind,	 let	us	have	a	 look	at	Table	1	 that	 gives	data	on	FDI	stock	 in	 the	Visegrád	countries	 in	absolute	value	and	 in	percentage	of	 the	GDP.	 What	 we	 can	 definitely	 state	 is	 that	 in	 both	 terms	 the	 stock	 of	 FDI	 increased	considerably	during	15	years.	
                                                4	 “We	 have	 identified	 two	 types	 of	 activities	 that	 resulting	 huge	 transactions	without	 any	 effect	 on	 the	domestic	 economy:	 one	 is	 capital	 in	 transit,	 the	 other	 is	 restructuring	 of	 asset	 portfolios,	 when	transactions	are	related	to	a	financial	restructuring	of	some	affiliate	of	MNEs.	Besides	capital	in	transit,	restructuring	of	asset	portfolios	has	similar	effects	on	FDI	flows	(sharp	increase	and	decrease	in	flows),	these	impacts	on	statistical	data	are	very	similar	to	that	of	SPEs”	(Montvai	2015	p.6)	5	http://www.nbp.pl/homen.aspx?f=/en/publikacje/ziben/ziben.html		
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 Table	1.	FDI	Stock,	million	EUR	and	percentage	of	GDP	
 2000	 %	 2010	 %	 2015	 %	Czech	Republic	 23	323	 35.0	 96	153	 61.5	 100	076*	 63.8	Hungary**	 21	048	 41.1	 67	999	 69.1	 76	672	 69.9	Poland	 36	792	 19.7	 161	378	 44.6	 167	091	 38.9	Slovakia	 4	026	 18.0	 37	665	 55.7	 40	129	 50.9	Source:	WIIW	Handbook	of	Statistics,	2016	
*2014 data 
** Data without FDI in Special Purpose Entities 
 Except	for	Poland	FDI	stock	represents	everywhere	more	than	50%	of	the	GDP.	It	is	an	 illustration	of	 the	well	known	 fact	 that	 these	 countries	have	become	dependent	on	foreign	capital.	This	dependency	is	present	both	from	the	macroeconomic	point	of	view	(see	“dependent	economy	model”	by	Nölke	and	Vliegenthart	2009)	and	also	on	regional,	local	level	(see	“nested	dependent	city	regions”	by	Jacobs,	2017).		
Investment	promotion	in	a	narrow	sense		During	 the	 nineties	 the	 Visegrád	 countries	 applied	 several	 kinds	 of	 FDI	 promoting	measures,	 allowances,	 grants,	 targeted	 for	 large	 multinational	 companies	(Sedmihradsky	and	Klazar,	2002).	After	the	adhesion	to	the	EU	this	should	have	become	more	difficult	because	of	competition	distortion.	Under	EU	law,	incentives	provided	for	investment	projects	classify	as	state	aid,	which	may	violate	the	EU’s	competition	policy:	Article	107	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	prohibits	any	state	aid	that	may	distort	competition	within	the	EU6.	While	targeted	sectoral	aid	is	generally	not	supported,	state	aid	promoting	the	development	of	an	economically	backward	area	can	 be	 compatible	 with	 EU	 law7.	 This	 is	 especially	 relevant	 for	 Central	 and	 East	European	countries	because	their	per	capita	GDP	is	well	below	the	EU	average	in	most	of	
                                                6	The	latest	regulation	to	the	Treaty:	law:	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.187.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2014:187:TOC		7	 Article	 107(3a):..	 may	 be	 considered	 to	 be	 compatible	 with	 the	internal	market:	 aid	 to	 promote	 the	economic	development	of	areas	where	the	standard	of	living	is	abnormally	low	or	where	there	is	serious	underemployment,	and	of	the	regions	referred	to	in	Article	349,	in	view	of	their	structural,	economic	and	social	situation. 
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 the	regions.	Thus	incentives	provided	for	investments	in	these	backward	locations	of	the	Visegrád	countries	can	be	legally	justified	(Blauberger,	2009,	Medve-Bálint,	2014).	Among	the	Visegrád	countries,	Hungary	shows	the	highest	intensities	of	aid	within	all	the	region	(Table	2)	around	twice	as	high	than	the	EU-average.	Table	2.	State	Aid	in	%	of	GDP	and	Regional	aid	in	%	of	total	aids	
 EU	 CZ	 HU	 PL	 SK	
 SA/GDP	 REG	 SA/GDP	 REG	 SA/GDP	 REG	 SA/GDP	 REG	 SA/GDP	 REG	
2000	 0.48 20.28 2.22 2.13 1.10 18.57 0.95 36.73 0.55 61.81 
2001	 0.53 16.07 1.76 5.04 1.00 24.18 0.63 11.42 0.50 38.53 
2002	 0.66 14.92 3.63 2.40 1.03 25.20 0.44 13.53 0.42 44.17 
2003	 0.56 15.32 2.63 3.65 1.33 21.05 2.98 3.41 0.58 62.12 
2004	 0.47 16.56 0.34 36.90 0.89 25.41 1.04 9.19 0.67 54.11 
2005	 0.45 17.43 0.42 54.93 1.19 24.94 0.39 19.47 0.67 51.06 
2006	 0.62 13.61 0.52 40.43 1.13 24.83 0.46 32.21 0.50 66.70 
2007	 0.41 18.71 0.57 44.12 1.03 19.65 0.42 22.46 0.44 48.23 
2008	 0.54 18.88 0.73 65.15 1.85 16.14 0.74 18.54 0.47 56.93 
2009	 0.54 24.36 0.55 45.65 1.34 27.28 0.77 22.24 0.39 42.87 
2010	 0.50 22.31 0.63 44.06 1.88 15.42 0.79 25.71 0.37 45.41 
2011	 0.44 22.72 0.76 59.29 0.93 25.81 0.58 24.53 0.23 70.45 
2012	 0.44 20.72 0.88 60.47 0.91 30.28 0.58 30.34 0.16 57.45 
2013	 0.44 21.71 1.01 53.92 1.18 26.75 0.56 36.09 0.24 40.32 
2014	 0.65 16.21 1.02 52.41 1.38 58.35 1.14 39.85 0.39 35.67 
2015	 0.62 11.01 1.16 56.48 1.17 33.69 0.73 23.07 0.51 53.36 Source:	Own	calculations	from	European	Commission	State	Aid	Scoreboard8	data		 The	economic	effects	of	EU	membership	may	also	have	 forced	the	new	members	 to	increase	their	aid	in	order	to	cope	with	the	more	competitive	situation.	Apart	from	that	the	 crisis	 had	 also	 sharpened	 competition	 among	 countries.	Data	 of	 Table2	 show	 that	after	 the	 international	 crisis	 the	Czech	Republic	 increased	 its	 state	aid	 intensity	again,	devoting	aid	to	regional	development.	In	 the	 following	we	describe	 the	 financial	 investment	grant	systems,	 tax	allowances	and	system	of	established	special	economic	zones	for	(mainly	foreign)	 investors	 in	the	four	 countries.	 We	 rely	 on	 official	 sources,	 as	 for	 investment	 grant	 possibilities	 are	openly	“advertised”	on	the	homepages	of	the	ministries,	promotion	organisations.	Regarding	Hungary	the	maximum	available	amounts	of	regional	incentives	are	based	on	a	regional	aid	map.	All	seven	regions	of	Hungary	are	qualified	for	incentives,	and	aid	
                                                8	http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html	
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 intensity	 varies	 between	 10%	 and	 50%	 for	 large	 corporations9.	When	 calculating	 the	maximum	 available	 amount	 of	 regional	 incentives,	 all	 regional	 incentives	 -	 cash	subsidies,	 tax	 incentives	 -	need	 to	be	 taken	 into	account.	The	main	 types	of	 incentives	related	 to	 investments	 are	 cash	 subsidies,	 tax	 incentives,	 low-interest	 loans,	 or	 land	available	for	free	or	at	reduced	prices.	The	regulations	on	incentive	opportunities	are	in	accordance	 with	 EU	 rules.	 The	 most	 important	 ones	 are	 cash	 subsidies	 and	 tax	allowances.	Figure	 1.	 Grants	 given	 in	 Hungary	 to	 companies	 by	 individual	 government	 decision	2004-2016	
0
50
100
150
200
250
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
EUR	mn
 Source:	calculations	based	on	data	of	www.kormany.hu	
 The	 main	 types	 of	 cash	 incentives	 related	 to	 investments	 are	 focused	 on	implementing	 the	 investment	 creating	 new	 jobs	 and	 training	 employees10.	 The	Hungarian	 Government	 provides	 a	 negotiation-based	 “VIP”	 subsidy	 opportunity	 for	investments	greater	than	EUR	10	million	with	a	certain	number	of	newly	created	jobs,	depending	on	the	purpose	and	location	of	the	investment.	If	the	investment	is	between	EUR	 10	 and	 25	 million,	 the	 Hungarian	 authorities	 will	 investigate	 the	 possibility	 of	subsidizing	the	project	from	available	EU	Funds.	The	main	areas	that	attract	support	are	
                                                9	Aid	intensities:	25%	in	the	Western	Transdanubia	region	and	35%	in	the	Central	Transdanubia	region.	In	the	Northern	Hungary,	Northern	Great	Plain,	Southern	Great	Plain,	and	Southern	Transdanubia	regions,	the	maximum	aid	intensity	is	50%.	10	http://eugo.gov.hu/doing-business-hungary/investment-incentives			
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 investments	 in	manufacturing,	 shared	 service	 centres,	 research	 and	development,	 and	tourism	projects11.	The	government	also	offers	what	is	known	as	the	VIP	subsidy	opportunity	for	training	
employees	 for	new	positions.	The	 subsidy	 is	 available	 to	 investors	 creating	 at	 least	 50	new	jobs.12.	The	training	subsidy	is	not	a	regional	incentive,	thus	it	can	be	granted	on	top	of	the	maximum	regional	aid	intensity.	A	job	creation	subsidy	is	also	provided	for	those	investments	entitled	to	VIP	investment	subsidies	and	that	create	at	least	250	new	jobs	in	disadvantaged	or	least-developed	micro-regions.	The	maximum	available	subsidy	is	EUR	3	 million,	 depending	 on	 the	 location	 and	 the	 number	 of	 new	 employees.	 A	 subsidy	opportunity	 is	 also	 available	 for	 establishing	 vocational	 training	 facilities	 and	 the	development	of	the	equipment	for	practical	training13.	Cash	subsidy	opportunities	are	available	from	the	Hungarian	national	budget	for	R&D	
activities	 involving	 a	 broad	 cooperation	 of	 companies,	 universities	 and	 research	institutions.	 The	 subsidies	 are	 available	 through	 a	 tendering	 process.	 Tender	opportunities	are	available	 from	EU	Funds,	 for	which	 investments	of	 less	 than	EUR	10	million	 can	 also	 qualify.	 The	 tenders	 reflect	 the	 importance	 given	 to	 supporting	 R&D	activities,	the	creation	of	new	workplaces,	environmental	investments,	and	technological	investments	(with	preference	given	to	small	and	medium	sized	enterprises).	Various	 Corporate	 Income	 Tax	 and	 Local	 Business	 Tax	 bases	 incentives	 and	allowances	 apply	 to	 special	 business	 areas	 and	 activities,	 for	 example	 projects	implemented	and	operated	in	a	free	entrepreneurship	zone.	The	free	entrepreneurship	
                                                11	In	order	to	be	eligible	for	the	subsidy,	50-100	new	jobs	have	to	be	created	by	the	investor	in	the	case	of	manufacturing	 investments,	depending	on	 the	region	where	 the	 investment	 takes	place.	 In	 the	case	of	large	investments	of	more	than	EUR	50	million,	100-200	new	jobs	have	to	be	created,	depending	on	the	place	of	the	investment.	In	the	case	of	establishing	or	expanding	SSCs,	at	least	100	new	jobs	have	to	be	created	in	general,	and	at	least	200	new	jobs	in	central	Hungary.	In	the	case	of	R&D	related	investments	at	least	10	new	jobs	have	to	be	created	in	connection	with	the	R&D	activity.	12	The	maximum	amount	of	the	training	subsidy	for	creating	50	to	500	new	jobs	is	EUR	1	and	2	million	for	creating	more	than	500	new	jobs.	It	is	provided	for	both	general	and	special	training.	The	maximum	aid	intensity	is	60%	in	the	case	of	general	training	and	25%	for	targeted	training.	The	aid	intensity	can	be	increased	 further	 in	 the	 case	 of	 small-	 and	medium-sized	 enterprises	 and	 for	 training	 of	 disabled	 or	disadvantaged	workers	13	 In	 order	 to	 be	 eligible	 for	 the	 subsidy,	 the	 number	 of	 vocational	 school	 students	 with	 training	agreements	has	to	be	 increased	by	at	 least	50	compared	to	the	average	number	of	 trainees	 in	the	two	school	years	prior	to	the	submission	of	the	subsidy	request.	The	maximum	subsidy	amount	is	EUR	8,000	per	student,	and	the	total	subsidy	received	cannot	exceed	EUR	2	million	per	beneficiary.	
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 zones	cover	over	900	settlements	 in	 the	unprivileged	areas	of	Hungary	designated	by	the	 government	 are	 treated	 jointly	 for	 regional	 development	 purposes14.	 The	 most	important	tax	scheme	is	the	development	tax	incentive.	Each	development	tax	incentive	may	be	claimed	for	a	10-year	period	(beginning	after	completion	of	the	development)	in	Corporate	Income	Tax	returns	within	a	maximum	period	of	14	years	 from	the	original	application	for	the	incentive.	In	any	given	tax	year,	the	tax	incentive	is	available	for	up	to	80%	of	the	tax	payable,	but	in	total	up	to	the	state	aid	intensity	ceiling.	In	2012	the	Hungarian	government	 introduced	the	system	of	“strategic	agreements”	signed	with	 a	number	of	 foreign	 companies.	The	aim	was	 to	 encourage	 the	 activity	of	selected	multinational	 firms	with	 the	declaration	of	 partnership.	Up	 till	May	2017	 the	number	 of	 signed	 strategic	 agreements	 is	 74,	 out	 of	which	 65	 partners	were	 foreign-owned	 companies15.	 The	partners	 are	 concentrated	mainly	 in	 electronics,	 automotive-	and	pharmaceutical	industries.	Agreements	were	initiated	mostly	by	the	government.16	The	 content	 of	 the	 framework	 agreements	 was	 rather	 uniform,	 stating	 intention	 of	general	cooperation	in	job	creation,	training	and	education,	R&D,	local	supplier	network	development.	 According	 to	 Transparency	 International	 Hungary	 (2014)	 foreign	 firms	hoped	 that	 this	 new	 agreement	 would	 ease	 communication	 with	 the	 Hungarian	government	despite	of	its	often	unfriendly	rhetoric.	In	 the	Czech	Republic	 the	 Investment	 Incentive	Act	was	amended	 in	May	2015	with	the	aim	to	increase	the	attractiveness	for	investors	and	to	reduce	the	impact	of	the	EU	rules	(KPMG,	2016).	 	Incentives	are	provided	in	the	following	forms:	corporate	income	tax	relief	for	up	to	10	years	(tax	holiday);	employment	subsidies	as	cash	grants	for	job	creation	 and	 training	 (only	 vailable	 in	 regions	 with	 high	 unemployment	 rates);	 cash	grants	 for	 strategic	 projects;	 availability	 of	 land	 at	 discounted	prices;	 exemption	 from	real	estate	tax	in	strategic	industrial	zones.	The	following	conditions	apply	for	all	types	of	 investments:	 The	 acquisition	 of	 assets	 for	 the	 project,	 including	 construction	work,	cannot	start	before	the	application	for	incentives	is	submitted.	The	investment	must	be	
                                                
14 http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/Hungary-Corporate-Tax-credits-and-incentives 
15 http://www.kormany.hu/hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/strategiai-partnersegi-megallapodasok 
16 There is a set of conditions that applies for big multinational business (5 years track record in Hungary, 
significant contribution to GDP production and exports, investments exceeding HUF 5 billion, contribution to 
employment – at least 1000 own employment, intention to increase job creation for skilled workers, 
participation in education -, at least 10 % local supplier input in production). 
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 maintained	 (in	 the	 minimum	 amount	 and	 structure)	 for	 at	 least	 five	 years	 from	 its	finalization.	Large	strategic	investments	can	obtain	higher	incentives	in	cash	instead	of	tax	relief.	Cash	grants	can	reach	up	to	10%	and	can	be	further	increased	to	12.5%	in	case	of	projects	combining	manufacturing	sites	and	technology	centres17.	The	agency	Czechinvest	provides	a	detailed	table	on	state	support	 for	companies	as	regional	aid	between	1998-2017.	Table	3	shows	the	largest	grant	cases	(Hyundai,	Nexen	are	 outstanding).	 The	 main	 conditions	 for	 granting	 investment	 incentives	 differ	depending	on	the	supported	activity	(manufacturing,	technology	or	service	centers)	but	usually	 prescribe	minimum	 investment	 sum	 and	 number	 of	 jobs,	 new	machinery,	 etc.	(KPMG,	2016)18.	If	the	project	is	located	in	a	“strategic”	industrial	zone,	the	employment	grant	is	higher.	There	are	six	strategic	industrial	zones	(Ostrava-Mosnov,	Holesov,	Most-Joseph,	Triangle,	Kolín-Ovcáry,	Nad	Barborou).	These	 strategic	 industrial	 zones	 and	 other	 agglomerations	 are	 important	 FDI	attracting	 areas.	 	 Hecht	 (2015)	 analysed	 the	 regional	 determinants	 that	 influence	 the	location	choice	of	German	multinationals	in	the	Czech	Republic.	She	found	that	German	investors	 prefer	 to	 locate	 in	 densely	 populated	 regions	 and	 in	 regions	 with	 a	comparative	advantage	in	the	industry	of	the	investment.	Apart	from	that	regions	with	a	high	number	of	other	German	companies	proved	to	be	especially	attractive	for	German	investors.	 Several	 recent	 larger	 foreign	 investment	 decision	 targets	 industrial	 zones.	(Chinese	 A123	 Systems,	 a	manufacturer	 of	 advanced	 lithium-ion	 batteries,	 opened	 its	new	 production	 facility	 in	 Ostrava	 in	 March	 2017.	 This	 is	 the	 company’s	 first	manufacturing	plant	in	Europe.	The	factory	in	the	Ostrava-Hrabová	industrial	zone	will	
                                                17	For	strategic	investments	in	the	manufacturing	industry,	the	minimum	amount	to	be	invested	in	fixed	assets	is	CZK	500	million,	of	which	CZK	250	million	must	be	invested	in	new	machinery.	At	least	500	jobs	must	be	created.	For	strategic	investments	into	technology	centres,	the	minimum	amount	to	be	invested	in	fixed	assets	is	CZK	200	million,	of	which	CZK	100	million	must	be	invested	in	new	machinery.	At	least	100	jobs	must	be	created.	18	In	the	case	of	manufacturing	industry:	establishment	of	a	new	manufacturing	plant,	or	expansion	of	an	existing	plant,	including	its	modernization	and	diversification	of	product	portfolio;	minimum	investment	in	tangible	and	intangible	assets	of	CZK	100	million.	(approx.	EUR	3.6	million),	in	selected	regions	this	is	reduced	to	CZK	50	million.	Machinery	must	be	new;	creation	of	at	least	20	new	jobs.				For	 technology	 centres:	 establishment	 of	 a	 new	 technology	 centre,	 or	 expansion	 of	 an	 existing	technology	 centre;	minimum	 investment	 in	 tangible	 and	 intangible	 assets	 of	 CZK	 10	million	 (approx.	EUR	360,000),	of	which	at	least	CZK	5	million	must	be	invested	in	machinery.	Machinery	must	be	new;	creation	of	at	least	20	new	jobs.				Business	 support	 services	 centres:	creation	of	 at	 least	20	new	 jobs	 for	 software	development	 centres,	500	new	jobs	for	customer	support	centre	or	70	new	jobs	for	other	business	support	services	centres.		
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 annually	produce	more	than	600,000	automobile	batteries	for	the	European	market.	In	the	 future,	 the	 company	 plans	 to	 employ	 150	 people,	 primarily	 highly	 qualified	technicians	 and	 engineers19.	 Chassix,	 a	 USA	 based	 global	 automotive	 supplier	 of	precision	casting	and	machining	solutions,	in	March	2017	announced	plans	to	establish	a	 greenfield	 plant	 in	 Ostrava,	Czech	 Republic.	 It	 will	 be	 the	 third	 plant	 of	 Chassix	 in	Europe	 after	 France	 and	 Spain	 and	will	 start	 to	 operate	 in	 2018	 and	 accounts	 for	 an	investment	of	about	$50	million.	Chassix	Ostrava	is	expected	to	generate	approximately	350	skilled	jobs	in	the	region.20)		Table	3:	Large	state	aid	cases	in	the	Visegrád	countries	2004-2017	
HUNGARY	 Aid	EUR	
mn	
EUR	
th	
per	
job	
SLOVAKIA	 Aid	EUR	
mn	
EUR	
th	
per	
job	Mercedes-Benz,	(D)	2008	 88.1 35.2 Kia	 Motors	 Slovakia,	 (KR)	2004	 179.7 75.7 Apollo	Tyres,	(IN)	2014		 51.9 53.6 PCA	Slovakia	(FR)	2003		 166.0 47.4 Hankook	Tire,(KR)	2005	 63.5 42.1 Jaguar	Land	Rover	(UK)	2016		 125.0 45.4 AUDI	Hungaria,	(D)	2011	 46.5 25.8 Samsung	Display	(KR)	2007		 74.9 62.4 Mercedes-Benz,	(D)	2016		 41.4 41.4 Duslo,	a.s.	(CZ)	2014		 58.5 45.0 ThyssenKrupp,	(D)	2016	 34.1 75.8 Mobis	Slovakia	(KR)	2004	 47.3 50.8 Elektrolux	Lehel	(SK)	2004	 30.7 29.2 Foxconn	Slovakia	2006	 38.8 25.8 AGC	Glass	(JP)	2005	 29.3 73.3 Kia	 Motors	 Slovakia	 (KR)	2007	 38.2 57.7 Hankook	Tire,	(KR)	2013	 25.8 27.2 AU	Optronics	(MY)	2009	 38.2 29.4 SMR	 Automotive	 Mirror	Technology	(IN)	2016	 24.8 55.0 Samsung	 Electronics	Slovakia	(KR)	2006	 36.4 45.5 
 
                                                19	http://www.czechinvest.org/en/a123-systems-opens-new-factory-in-the-czech-republic	20http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/chassix-plans-new-czech-republic-casting-foundry-300424015.html	
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CZ	REP	 Aid	Eur	
mn	 EUR	th		per	job	 POLAND	(data	until	2010)	 Aid	Eur	mn	 EUR	th		per	job	Hyundai	Motor21,	(KR)	2006	 194.5 55.3 Mercedes Benz22 (D) 2017 18.7 46.7 Nexen	Tire	Corp,	(KR)	2016	 129.0 93.2 IBM Global Services  Delivery Centre 2010 7.4 2.5 Daikin	Device,	(JP)	2006	 55.4 68.7 Michelin Polska23 (F) 2014 7.2 28.8 IPS	Alpha	Techn.	(JP)	2006	 49.9 23.7 Orion Electric24 (JP) 2007  6.8 13.6 Bosch	Diesel,	(NL)	2005	 47.8 130.1 Nokia Siemens (Fi) Network 2010 5.1 12.7 Glaverbel	Czech,	(NL)	2006	 47.7 671,49 Ford Werke Gmbh25 (D) 2009 4.2 4.0 Knauf	 Insulation,	 (FR)	2006	 47.5 316,72 Fiat Powertrain (IT) 2010  3.6 9.0 Tivall	CZ,	(IL)	2006	 47.4 158,14 Cadbury Wedel (UK) 2008 3.0 4.0 ELBEL	(IT)	2006	 43.5 36,73 Goodrich Aerospace (UK) 2010 2.9 11.8 Automotive	Lighting	(D)	2006	 43.2 68,34 MTU Aero Engines (D) 2009  2.9 7.2 
 Source:	 calculations	 from	 data	 of	 www.czechinvest.org,	 www.kormany.hu,	 www.economy.gov.sk	 and	Slusarczyk	and	Kot	(2012)	and	the	European	Commission	documents	given	in	footnotes	In	 Slovakia,	 according	 to	 the	 amendment	 of	 the	 Investment	 Aid	 Act	 in	 2015,	investment	 grants	 and	 employment	 grants	 are	 offered	 to	 industrial	 projects,	technological	 centres	 (R&D,	 production	 and	 technology	 upgrade),	 strategic	 services	centres	(entities	with	high	value	added	employing	experts)	and	tourist	services	centres	(offering	 at	 least	 three	 types	 of	 services)26.	 Each	 category	 has	 specifically	 defined	conditions	which	 shall	 be	met	 in	 order	 to	 apply	 for	 the	 investment	 incentives.	 These	incentives	can	be:	a	subsidy	for	the	acquisition	of	material	assets	and	immaterial	assets;	
                                                21	http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/217057/217057_740586_58_1.pdf	22	http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/268157/268157_1871419_10_1.pdf	23	http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/252931/252931_1579423_90_2.pdf	24	http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/218154/218154_770525_20_1.pdf	25	http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/228855/228855_991575_85_2.pdf	26	www.sario.sk/sites/default/files/.../sario-investment-aid-act-2015.pdf	
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 an	 income	 tax	 relief;	 a	 contribution	 for	 created	 new	 jobs;	 transfer	 of	 immovable	property	or	exchange	of	immovable	property	at	a	price	lower	than	a	general	asset	value.	The	 aim	of	 the	 Slovak	 authorities	 is	 to	 guide	new	 investments	 to	 high	unemployment	regions	(KPMG	2016b)27.	The	 creation	 of	 industrial	 parks	 in	 Slovakia	 started	 later	 than	 in	 the	 other	 three	countries,	because	of	the	government	bias	against	foreign	capital	before	1998	(Surkala,	2014).	However,	in	2001	the	Act	on	Industrial	Parks	was	adopted.	In	the	first	years,	the	state	 supported	 the	 construction	of	 industrial	parks	 in	 the	 amount	of	 roughly	EUR	15	million	 per	 year	 but	 for	 today	 the	 support	 is	 already	 hundreds	 of	millions	 of	 euros.28	Under	 Sectoral	 Operational	 Program	 Industry	 and	 Services	 (2004-2006)	 and	 the	Operational	 Program	 Competitiveness	 and	 Economic	 Growth	 (2007	 -	 2013),	 a	 non-repayable	 financial	 contribution	 of	 more	 than	 EUR	 110	 million	 was	 granted	 for	 the	construction	of	24	industrial	parks.29	In	Slovakia	between	2004	and	2016	the	average	support	was	about	30,000	euros	per	job	created.	However,	-	as	examples	in	table	3	also	show	-	18	investment	received	more	than	 EUR	 50,000	 per	 job	 (Vlachynsky	 and	 Kristály,	 2017).	 Multiple	 companies	 have	received	investment	 incentives	repeatedly30.	Some	measures	are	not	 formally	 included	into	official	investment	stimulus	statistics.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	the	Jaguar	grant31	the	cost	of	extensive	construction	of	engineering	networks,	 railway	 terminal,	highway,	riverbeds	 and	 other	 investments,	 should	 be	 around	 additional	 300	 million	 euros.	Officially	 this	 is	 not	 assistance	 for	 Jaguar,	 but	 for	 the	whole	 of	 the	 industry	 park	 but	without	the	arrival	of	the	big	investor	these	investments	would	not	have	been	realised.	In	May	2017,	the	European	Commission	announced	that	will	investigate	if	the	support	is	really	 necessary	 for	 Jaguar	 Land	 Rover	 and	 the	 firm	will	 lose	 part	 of	 the	money	 if	 it	distorts	competition.32	(Jaguar	investment	anyway	attracts	further	foreign	suppliers	too.	
                                                27	The	total	aid	cannot	exceed	between	EUR	20,000	and	EUR	30,000	per	new	job.	An	eligible	investment	project	must	create	at	least	40	new	jobs	or	10	new	jobs	for	the	least	developed	regions	and	these	jobs	must	be	kept	for	at	least	a	five	year	period.	28	http://alianciapas.sk/priemyselne-parky-na-slovensku-ich-rozvoj-a-fungovanie/	29http://www.siea.sk/priemyselne-parky/c-2409/priemyselne-parky-podporene-zo-strukturalnych-fondov-europskej-unie/	30	16	companies	received	two	incentives	and	6	companies	received	up	to	three	incentives.	31	In	2016	Slovakian	government	approved	130	million	euros	in	direct	aid	to	Jaguar	Land	Rover	to	build	plant	with	an	annual	output	of	up	to	150,000	cars.	32	https://www.ft.com/content/c0539756-408e-11e7-9d56-25f963e998b2	
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 In	2016	the	Spanish	company	Gestamp	announced	it	would	invest	EUR	133	million	near	the	city	of	Nitra	in	Slovakia.	The	new	firm	will	be	a	supplier	to	Jaguar	Land	Rover.	The	plant	will	 start	production	 in	2018,	 focusing	on	products	which	reduce	vehicle	weight	while	maintaining	 safety.	 Nitra	 will	 be	 Gestamp’s	 eighth	 plant	 in	 the	 Visegrád	 region	comprising	 Slovakia,	 Poland,	 Hungary	 and	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 where	 the	 company	employs	2,500	workers.	The	new	project	will	create	229	jobs33.)	
Figure 3. Investment stimuli from the Slovak government 2004-2016 
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 Source:	Vlachynsky	–	Kristály,	2017	Note:	2004:	KIA,	2006:	Samsung,	Sony,	suppliers	of	KIA,	the	2016	figure	includes	the	announced	state	aid	to	Jaguar.	With	additional	infrastructure	the	sum	would	be	around	EUR	300	million.		 In	 Poland	 cash	 grants	 are	 offered	 by	 the	 state	 for	 projects	 in	 the	 automotive,	electronics,	 aviation,	 biotechnological,	 food-processing,	 business	 services	 and	 R&D	sectors,	as	well	as	for	large	projects	in	any	other	sector.	The	subsidies	vary	depending	on	the	value	of	the	investment	or	the	number	of	new	jobs	created34.	Governmental	grants	are	 provided	 on	 the	 basis	 of	“Programme	 for	 supporting	 investments	 of	 major	importance	 to	 the	 Polish	 economy	 for	 years	 2011-2023”35.	 Support	 is	 granted	 in	 the	form	of	a	grant	on	the	basis	of	a	bilateral	agreement	between	the	Minister	of	Economy	and	the	 investor.	Only	those	entrepreneurs	planning	to	 invest	 in	the	 following	priority	sectors	 can	 apply	 for	 support:	 automotive	 sector,	 electronic	 sector	 and	 household	
                                                33	http://www.automotivemanufacturingsolutions.com/news/gestamp-open-aluminium-plant-nitra	34	http://www.financialobserver.eu/poland/poland-fails-to-improve-its-investment-incentives-4/	35	http://www.paih.gov.pl/governmental_grants	
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 appliances	production,	aviation	sector,	biotechnology	sector,	agro-food	sector,	modern	services,	research	and	development36.	The	 program	 envisages	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 support	 for	 the	 cost	 of	 creating	 new	 jobs	(grant	for	employment)	depending	on	the	number	of	new	jobs	created,	the	percentage	of	employees	 with	 higher	 education,	 location,	 investment	 expenditures,	 sector.	 On	 the	other	 hand	 support	 is	 provided	 for	 eligible	 costs	 of	 a	 new	 investment	 (investment	grant).	 The	 amount	 of	 support	 for	 eligible	 costs	 of	 a	 new	 investment	depends,	 among	others	from	the	number	of	new	jobs,	 the	amount	of	 investment	per	one	place	of	work,	location.	There	 are	 four	 regions	 in	Eastern	Poland	where	 the	highest	 level	 of	 possible	state	aid	up	to	50	percent	 is	still	permitted.	Even	in	Warsaw	some	support	 is	possible,	which	 is	 a	 difference	 from	 other	 CEE	 countries	where	 state	 aid	 is	 not	 allowed	 at	 the	capital	regions.	There	 are	 significant	 incentives	 in	 the	 Special	 Economic	 Zones	 (SEZ)	 being	administratively	 separate	 parts	 of	 Polish	 territory,	 allocated	 for	 the	 running	 of	businesses	on	preferential	terms37.	SEZ	were	created	in	1994	and	their	regulation	was	several	times	modified.	A	critical	analysis	of	SEZ	policy	is	given	by	Gwosdz	et	al	(2008).	The	initial	 idea	of	keeping	the	zones	in	the	originally	designated	areas	was	changed	as	early	 as	 1997,	 mainly	 for	 political	 reasons.	 	 Subsequently,	 local	 governors,	 including	zone	administrators	and	also	in	some	cases	the	foreign	investors	themselves,	have	been	able	 to	 bargain	 to	make	 the	 policy	 applicable	 in	 areas	 adjacent	 or	 other	 areas	 to	 the	original	zones38.	
                                                
36 In addition, support may be requested by entrepreneurs planning production investments in other sectors, with 
a minimum eligible cost of PLN 750 million and creating at least 200 new jobs, or a minimum eligible cost of 
PLN 500 million, and creating at least 500 new jobs (significant investments). 
37 http://www.paih.gov.pl/investment_support/sez 
38 Because of pressure from large companies, SEZs were located in places without high unemployment rates. 
Gliwice is a good example of where a SEZ was clearly opened under the pressure of General Motors, who 
made the opening of the zone a condition precedent to the location of the new Opel plant there. An even more 
unequivocal example is provided at Kwidzyn and Bielsko-Biala where land owned by Philips and Fiat were 
given special zone benefits, as a result of effective lobbying by a coalition of company management, trade 
unions, and local politicians. Both Fiat and Philips made the continuation of their investments in their locations 
conditional on gaining such privileges (Gwosdz et al 2008). 
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 Fourteen	Special	Economic	Zones	have	been	set	up	 for	 the	purpose	of:	 speeding	up	development	of	the	Polish	regions39.	The	total	area	of	the	SEZ	cannot	exceed	25,000	Ha,	and	 the	 final	 date	 of	 their	 operation	 was	 extended	 to	 31	 December	 2026.	 The	 main	benefits	 of	 investing	 in	 SEZs	 are	 among	 others:	 corporate	 income	 tax	 exemption,	availability	 of	 land	 and	 infrastructure;	 opportunity	 to	 buy	 or	 rent	 a	 property,	 other	incentives	 like	 exemptions	 from	 real	 estate	 tax,	 investment	 grant	 from	 the	administration	 state,	 subsidized	 employment.	 However,	 some	 say	 that	 the	 policy	 of	special	economic	zones	creates	islands	where	it	is	better	than	other	parts	of	the	country	and	 because	 mainly	 foreign	 firms	 use	 the	 benefits,	 it	 discriminates	 domestic	companies40.	Grants	 by	 municipalities	 and	 cities	 can	 also	 be	 various	 in	 the	 Visegrád.	 TPCA	 was	granted	 generous	 incentives	 from	 both	 the	 Czech	 state	 and	 from	 the	 town	 of	 Kolín,	which	 paid	 for	 the	 complete	 development	 of	 the	 industrial	 zone,	 costs	 of	 traffic	 route	extensions,	 sound	barriers,	new	housing	units	and	other	adequate	 infrastructure.	As	a	result	of	all	of	this	the	town	of	Kolín	is	indebted	until	2019	(Guidote,	2008).	For	Hyundai	an	 industrial	 park	was	 built,	 the	 region	 of	 the	 Czech	 Nošovice	 took	 responsibility	 for	preparing	 the	 site	 for	 the	 erection	 of	 the	 industrial	 zone	 at	 its	 own	 expenses.	Furthermore,	they	agreed	to	build	all	the	utilities	needed,	roads,	railways,	services	and	other	facilities	(Bobák,	2011).	Swiss	Rehau41	plans	to	increase	the	output	capacity	of	its	factory	 in	 Jevíčko,	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 aiming	 to	 create	 about	 120	 new	 jobs	 at	 the	
                                                39	 The	 leading	 investors	 within	 special	 economic	 zones	 by	 investment	 expenditure	 include:	 General	Motors	 Manufacturing	 Poland	 (USA),	 Volkswagen	 Poznań	 (Germany),	 Toyota	 Motor	 Manufacturing	Poland	 (Japan),	 Volkswagen	 Motor	 Polska	 (Netherlands),	 Michelin	 Polska	 (Switzerland),	 Electrolux	Poland	(Sweden),	Gillette	Poland	International	(Luxembourg),	LG	Display	Poland	(South	Korea).	40	 For	 example	 according	 to	 the	 Polish	 ministry	 of	 economy	 data	 turbines	 and	 component	 producer	Hispano	Suiza	received	EUR	3,85	mn	in	exchange	for	employing	109	people	at	a	factory	in	Sędziszów	Małopolski.	It	costs	almost	EUR	35	thousand	per	job.	Samsung,	which	opened	a	new	production	line	in	Wronki,	received	EUR	4	million.	The	company	promised	to	employ	251	workers,	 it	 is	almost	EUR	16	thousand	per	job.							http://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/specjalne-strefy-ekonomiczne-polski-podatnik,56,0,1900344.html	41	Rehau	is	a	global	polymer	processing	company	supplying	products	to	the	construction	and	automotive	industries.	 The	 company’s	 Czech	 subsidiary	 supplies	 various	 injection	 moulded	 parts	 and	 sealing	systems	to	a	number	of	car	producers.	The	Swiss	company’s	Czech	subsidiary,	Rehau	Automotive,	s.r.o.,	owns	a	production	facility	in	Moravská	Třebová,	in	the	country’s	east.	The	company	has	been	active	in	the	Czech	Republic	since	1992.	
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 plant42.	The	city	provides	protection	against	flooding	(the	plant	is	in	a	flood	area)	with	a	water	 trough	 for	 EUR24	 thousand.	 Some	 cities	 provide	 international	 school	development	 projects	 and	 family	 assistance	 to	 manager	 families	 or	 a	 free	 of	 charge	industrial	 property	 for	 50	 new	 jobs.43	 For	 KIA	 Slovakia	 a	 new	 health	 center,	 training	center,	 railway	 terminal	 and	 police	 station	 was	 built	 in	 Žilina	 1,000–1,200	 new	apartments	and	luxury	houses	close	to	Bratislava	for	South	Korean	managers.	For	PSA	a	French	school	was	established	in	Trnava,	among	others	(Pavlínek,	2014).	The	 above	 described	 investment	 incentives	 in	 a	 narrow	 sense	 are	 good	 tools	 for	influencing	 location	 choice	 of	 foreign	 investors.	 Competition	 for	 new	 investments	 is	strong	among	the	Visegrád	countries.	(In	the	beginning	of	2017	(among	other	projects)	Poland	 and	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 is	 in	 competition	 for	 Daimler’s	 new	 logistic	 centre44,	Hungary,	Slovakia	and	Romania	compete	for	a	new	large	Mitsubishi	plant45	that	would	produce	 engines,	 Poland	 and	Hungary	 compete	 for	 JP	Morgan’s	 new	 large	 back	 office	operations	 centre	 that	 would	 support	 the	 bank's	 European	 and	 Asian	 business46).	Bargaining	 between	 states	 and	 multinational	 companies	 on	 incentives	 and	 grants,	conditions	of	investment	can	be	complex	and	depends	also	on	the	strong	capacity	of	the	state	(Bakir,	2015).	The	“state”	itself	is	complex	because	consists	of	several	public	sector	actors,	 regional	 and	 national	 authorities	 among	 which	 efficient	 collaboration	 is	necessary.	 However,	 large	multinationals	 have	 their	 own	 “games”	 to	 put	 pressure	 on	governments	 as	 it	 is	 nicely	 detailed	 in	 Akcaoglu	 and	 Erol	 (2011)	 concerning	 the	competition	of	the	Czech	Republic	and	Turkey	for	Hyundai	Motor	investment	in	2005,	or	in	Pavlínek	(2014)	concerning	KIA47.	Corporates	can	influence	states	and	“capture”	them	
                                                42	http://www.autofox.cz/index.php?idx=71115	43	https://www.slideshare.net/csorjan/grants-for-manufacturing-in-eastern-europe	44https://prague.tv/en/s72/Directory/c214-Business/n8418-Daimler-may-build-Czech-warehouse	45http://www.intellinews.com/three-cee-countries-compete-for-200mn-mitsubishi-engine-plant-116965/	46http://www.businessinsider.com/r-jpmorgan-zooming-in-on-warsaw-for-new-global-back-office-center-2017-4?utm_content=buffer540be&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer-finance	47	KIA	in	August	2003	reported	that	the	factory	location	would	be	either	in	Hungary	or	in	Czechia.	“At	that	point,	 the	Slovak	minister	of	Economy	 traveled	 to	South	Korea	 to	present	 in	person	a	new	package	of	investment	incentives	to	the	management	of	Kia,	‘an	offer	which	was	impossible	to	refuse.	Kia	obviously	used	(in	vain)	the	late	Slovak	offer	to	attempt	to	obtain	bigger	incentives	from	Hungary	and	Czechia.		Kia	eventually	selected	Slovakia	on	2	March	2004.	Slovakia	simply	provided	everything	Kia	asked	for.	The	contract	was	extremely	onesided,	suggesting	a	very	asymmetrical	power	relationship	between	Kia	and	the	state”	(Pavlínek,	2014).	
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 (Pavlínek,	2014,	Bobák,	2011).	In	other	cases	–	like	in	Hungary	–	the	oligarchic	state	can	select	 certain	 foreign	 companies	 to	 demonstrate	 its	 patronage	 with	 support	 and	allowances	(Szanyi,	2016).	As	 Table	 3	 also	 shows,	 the	 largest	 state	 supports	 were	 provided	 to	 automotive	multinationals.	 The	 spectacular	 growth	 of	 Slovakian	 automotive	 industry	 has	 been	enhanced	 by	 the	 Slovakian	 government	 policy	 by	 applying	 narrow-type	 incentives	(Pavlínek,	2014).	Situation	is	similar	in	Hungary	and	in	the	Czech	Republic.	However,	the	degree	of	dependency	on	automotive	sector	 	 is	so	 large	for	today,	that	there	is	no	way	back,	 subsidies	will	 continue.	State	aid	 is	provided	not	only	 for	 creating	new	 jobs,	but	preserving	existing	ones	(not	to	leave	the	country).	If	we	examine	the	data	on	state	support	for	companies	provided	by	the	ministries,	it	is	obvious	 that	 in	 the	 past	 20	 years	 the	 largest	 amount	 of	 state	 aid	 has	 been	 given	 to	German	and	Asian	multinationals.	We	can	also	find	few	companies	from	other	Visegrád	countries	as	beneficiaries	of	subsidies	(for	example	the	greenfield	investment	of	Polish	Alumetal	in	Hungary).	However,	in	some	cases	these	are	not	original	regional	firms	but	affiliates	of	multinationals.	 (In	 the	 list	 of	 companies	 supported	by	 the	Slovak	 state	we	can	 find	 for	 example	 the	 “Hungarian”	 Yanfeng	 Automotive	 Interior	 Systems.)	What	 is	more,	 in	the	case	of	supporting	“domestic”	 firms,	also	these	companies	are	affiliates	of	foreign	 multinationals.	 Among	 for	 example	 the	 “Czech”	 companies	 supported	 (that	means	in	the	cell	“applicant’s	country	of	origin”	the	Czech	Republic	is	given)	we	can	see	Mondelez	 CR	 Biscuit,	 Robert	 Bosch,	 s.r.o,	 Johnson	 Controls	 International,	 s.r.o,	Muramoto	Manufacturing	Europe	s.r.o,	etc48.	Similarly,	 in	the	Slovak	state	aid	sheet	we	find	the	“Slovak”	T-Systems,	etc.	Thus,	similarly	to	indirect	FDI	exists	also	“indirect	state	aid”,	 formally	given	to	domestic	 firms	but	 in	reality	to	foreign	owned	joint	ventures	or	earlier	privatised	companies.	Apart	from	job	creation,	the	aim	of	subsidising	foreign	investors	can	be	the	boosting	of	 export.	 	 Automotive	 and	 electronic	 plants	 produce	 massively	 for	 export	 from	 the	Visegrád	countries.	The	 first	biggest	export	 items	of	 these	countries	are	usually	motor	vehicles,	 motors	 or	 automotive	 components	 (Éltető,	 2015).	 The	 mentioned	 plants	
                                                                                                                                                   	48	http://www.czechinvest.org/investicni-pobidky-nove,	Excel	sheet	
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 import	heavily,	so	domestic	value	added	is	extremely	low	in	these	countries’export.	This	fact	 can	 be	 considered	 a	 measure	 of	 inclusion	 into	 global	 value	 chains	 (Koopman	 et	al.2014,	Timmer	et	al.,	2015).	As	for	the	massive	volumes	of	exports	are	stemming	from	foreign	multinationals,	 their	 investment	 promotion	means	 trade	 promotion	 too	 at	 the	same	time.	Therefore	trade	and	investment	promotion	is	strongly	interconnected	in	the	Visegrád	 countries.	 Box	 1	 provides	 some	 examples	 of	 state	 supported,	 highly	 trade	intensive	multinationals.	
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 Box	1:	Some	individual	grant	cases	largely	affecting	trade	
Audi	-	Hungary	On	28	October	2009,	the	European	Commission	has	approved	a	regional	aid	package	of	EUR	49.52	million	for	an	 investment	project	of	 the	car	manufacturer	Audi	 in	Gyor,	Hungary,	which	belongs	 to	 the	German	Audi	AG,	part	of	the	Volkswagen	Group49.	The	regional	aid	was	a	direct	grant	in	the	years	2009-2013	and	a	corporate	 tax	allowance	 for	2012.	The	aid	 facilitates	 the	production	of	engine	components	and	 increase	the	overall	production	capacity	by	100’000-250’000	engines	per	year.	
Mercedes	–	Benz	Hungary	In	 July	2011	 the	Hungarian	authorities	provided	regional	aid	 to	Mercedes-Benz	Manufacturing	Hungary	Kft.	 for	 the	establishment	of	a	new	production	plant	 for	passenger	cars	 in	Kecskemét50.	The	beneficiary	firm	is	a	100	per	cent	subsidiary	of	Daimler	AG.	The	products	range	from	the	high-quality	small	cars	of	the	smart	brand	to	the	premium	automobiles	of	the	Mercedes-Benz.	The	financial	support	is	given	in	the	form	of	a	cash	grant	and	a	corporate	tax	allowance.	
General	Motors	–	Poland	On	 18	 December	 2012,	 the	 European	 Commission	 granted	 investment	 aid	 to	 the	 General	 Motors	Manufacturing	Poland	Sp.	z	o.o.	The	aid	worth	EUR	14.54	million	was	used	to	start	a	new	production	line	at	 the	 Gliwice	 factory	 in	 the	 Slaskie	 region	 for	 the	 fourth-generation	 Astra	 models	 in	 the	 years	 2012-201351.	The	beneficiary	company	belongs	to	the	Opel/Vauxhaull	corporation,	which	is	part	of	the	General	Motors	Group.	The	factory	in	Gliwice	produces	multiple	Opel	models	but	it	specializes	in	the	Astra	series.	Most	of	the	aid	originated	from	EU's	Operational	Fund	Innovative	Economy	and	amounted	to	EUR	12.36	million,	whereas	the	remaining	2.18	million	were	financed	by	Poland.		
Samsung	–	Poland	On	20	November	2013,	Poland	notified	the	EC	about	its	intention	to	support	Samsung	Electronics	Polska	Sp.	by	providing	an	adhoc	grant	of	EUR	0.9	million52.	Samsung	already	received	state	aid	in	relation	to	the	extension	of	the	Warsaw,	Lodz,	Poznan.	The	main	products	of	Samsung	Electronics	are	LCD	&	LED	panels,	mobile	 phones,	 semiconductors,	 hard	 disks,	 notebooks,	 digital	 cameras,	 printers	 and	 televisions.	 The	grants	 are	 used	 in	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 research	 facilities	 in	 Warsaw	 to	 develop	 software	 for	 smart	consumer	electronic	products.			
Mercedes	-	Poland	The	 factory	will	 be	 in	 Jawor,	 about	 430km	 southwest	 of	Warsaw,	 and	will	 be	Mercedes's	 first	 plant	 in	Poland	and	second	engine	 facility	outside	Germany	after	Beijing53.	The	 implementation	of	 the	project	 is	dependent	 on	 various	 investment	 conditions,	 including	 the	 granting	 of	 state	 aid,	 Daimler	 said.	 Polish	government	awarded	nearly	€	19	million	in	subsidies	to	the	Mercedes	engine	plant	in	Jawor54.	The	Jawor	factory	will	be	built	 in	a	special	economic	zone	and	Daimler	will	also	be	eligible	 for	CIT	exemption.	The	amount	of	the	tax	relief	has	not	been	disclosed.	At	least	400	people	will	work	at	the	Mercedes	factory	in	Lower	 Silesia	 and	 the	 plant	 will	 export	 engines	 worth	 nearly	 500	 million	 euros	 a	 year.	 Engines	 from	Poland	 will	 probably	 be	 sent	 to	 the	 factory	 opened	 in	 2012	 Mercedes	 cars	 in	 Hungary.	 There	 are	 4	thousand	 working	 there.	 Daimler	 announced	 that	 he	 would	 invest	 another	 €	 1.6	 billion	 to	 build	 a	Hungarian	factory	by	2019	and	build	a	second	factory	for	his	cars	by	2019.	
	
                                                49	http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/hungary-regional-aid-car-manufacturer-audi	50http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/hungary-aid-mercedes-benz-manufacturing-hungary-korl%C3%A1tolt-felel%C5%91ss%C3%A9g%C5%B1-t%C3%A1rsas%C3%A1g	51http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/poland-financial-aid-general-motors-manufacturing-poland-sp-z-oo	52	http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/poland-state-aid-electronics-producer-samsung	53	http://invest-in-wroclaw.pl/en/kolejne-miliardy-na-inwestycje/	54http://wyborcza.biz/biznes/1,100896,21095908,wicepremier-morawiecki-przyznal-prawie-19-mln-euro-dotacji-na.html?disableRedirects=true	
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Volkswagen	–	Slovakia	In	 December	 2008,	 the	 Slovak	 authorities	 notified	 their	 intention	 to	 grant	 aid	 for	 a	 large	 investment	project	by	Volkswagen	Slovakia	a.s.	in	Bratislava55.	The	Slovak	authorities	provided	regional	aid	of	EUR	14	300	000	to	Volkswagen	Slovakia	for	an	investment	project	in	Bratislava.		
AU	Optronics	–	Slovakia	In	2011	the	Commission	endorsed	Slovak	investment	aid	of	€	34.9	million	in	favour	of	AU	Optronics	for	setting	up	a	new	production	plant	for	the	manufacture	of	thin	film	transistor	liquid	crystal	display	(TFT-LCD)	modules	and	TV	sets56.	Annually,	the	facility	produces	up	to	6.3	million	LCD	modules	and	up	to	2.4	million	TV	sets	with	a	26	to	58-inch	screen.	The	total	investment	worth	around	€184	million	created	1300	jobs	 in	 Trenčín,	Western	 Slovakia,	which	 is	 also	 an	 area	 eligible	 for	 regional	 aid.	 Here	 too,	 the	market	shares	of	 the	beneficiary	remain	below	the	25%	threshold	on	all	plausible	market	definitions	and	these	markets	are	fast	growing.	AU	Optronics	was	founded	in	2009	and	operates	as	a	subsidiary	of	AU	Optronics	Corp.,	a	Taiwanese	electronics	manufacturer.		
Jaguar	-	Slovakia	The	Slovak	government	approved	around	130	million	euros	in	direct	aid	to	Jaguar	Land	Rover	in	2016	to	build	plant	with	an	annual	output	of	up	to	150,000	cars57.	The	investment	is	1.4	billion	euros	and	the	first	cars	are	expected	to	come	off	the	production	line	in	late	2018.	The	plant	will	employ	2,800	people58.	(The	recruitment	of	skilled	workers	caused	a	wage	increase	in	other	Slovakian	automotive	plants).		
Hyundai	Motor	Corporation		-	Czech	Republic	The	 investment	 took	 place	 in	 Nošovice	 (EUR	 194.49	 million),	 for	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 an	 automobile	manufacturing	plant	with	an	initial	production	capacity	of	200	000	vehicles	per	year.	The	total	investment	amounted	to	EUR	1.2	billion,	it	started	in	2006	and	was	expected	to	create	3514	new	jobs.59	The	local	land	owners	 and	 some	non-governmental	 organizations	opposed	 the	plan	of	 the	 industrial	 zone	 close	 to	 the	village	and	to	the	Beskydy	Protected	Landscape.	Czech	authorities	exerted	pressure	on	locals,	the	regional	Governor	offered	all	households	100	000	CZK	to	accept	the	construction	of	the	Hyundai	factory,	the	local	agricultural	 cooperative	 was	 threatened	 by	 expropriation,	 national	 law	 was	 modified	 and	 opposing	families	not	 selling	 their	 land	were	 threatened	by	anonym	 letters	 (Bobák,	2011).	Even	a	 film	was	made	from	the	story	of	the	Hyundai	site.60	Local	infrastructure	was	built	and	the	state	transferred	the	industrial	zone	land	to	Hyundai	at	a	reduced	(one	seventh)	price.	In	addition,	the	state	subsidised	created	jobs	and	requalification	and	Hyundai	got	exemption	from	value	added	tax	for	10	years.	The	state	was	also	obliged	to	 provide	 investment	 help	 to	 the	 other	 corporations	 which	 have	 been	 interconnected	 with	 Hyundai	(services,	suppliers).	Hyundai	produced	358	400	cars	in	2016,	mostly	for	export.	
                                                
55 http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/slovakia-state-aid-volkswagen-slovakia 
56 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-875_en.htm 
57 http://uk.reuters.com/article/slovakia-autos-idUKL8N1AS2LY 
58 http://media.jaguarlandrover.com/en-us/news/2016/09/jaguar-land-rover-begins-construction-slovakian-plant 
59 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/217057/217057_740586_58_1.pdf 
60 http://www.taskovskifilms.com/?film=all-for-the-good-of-the-world-and-nosovice 
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Bosch	–	Czech	Republic	Czech	government	approved	in	November	2016	that	German	Bosch	will	receive	an	incentive	of	up	to	444	million	 in	 the	Czech	Republic	 to	expand	production61.	Within	 three	years	Bosch	 intends	 to	 invest	1,294	million	crowns	in	the	expansion	of	existing	production	of	parts	and	accessories	for	motor	vehicles.	Thanks	to	this,	505	new	jobs	will	be	created	in	the	České	Budějovice	district.	The	company	also	plans	to	invest	904	million	crowns	in	the	expansion	of	the	R	&	D	Center	for	parts	and	accessories	for	the	next	four	years.	This	investment	will	create	120	new	jobs,	mainly	higher	and	vocational	secondary	education.	Robert	Bosch	is	the	 largest	 engineering	 firm	 in	 South	 Bohemia	 established	 in	 1992	 as	 the	 joint	 venture	 Robert	 Bosch	GmbH	Stuttgart	and	Motor	Jikov.	Since	1995,	it	is	a	wholly-owned	subsidiary	of	the	German	concern.	The	maximum	 rate	 of	 public	 support	may	 not	 exceed	 one	 fifth	 of	 the	 total	 eligible	 cost.	 By	way	 of	material	support	 for	 the	acquisition	of	 tangible	and	 intangible	 fixed	assets,	 the	company	could	receive	up	 to	275	million	crowns	for	both	projects,	the	remainder	being	a	reduction	of	income	tax.	
  
Investment	and	trade	promotion	in	a	wide	sense	In	 a	 wide	 sense	 investment	 promotion	 means	 such	 business	 conditions	 that	 are	favourable	 for	 the	 functioning	 of	 firms	 (either	 domestic	 or	 foreign).	 Apart	 from	regulatory	 factors	 (ease	 of	 doing	 business,	 bureaucracy)	 several	 other	 government	policies	 belong	 here.	 	 In	 some	 areas	 there	 are	 comparable	 indices	 gathered	 by	international	organisations.	Some	are	complex	ones,	constructed	from	sub-indices.	In	 the	 book	 of	 Götz	 (2016)	 EU	 countries’	 approach	 towards	 FDI	 is	 described	 by	available	 global	 indices,	 tools.	 These	 are:	 IRR	 –	 Investment	Regulatory	Restrictiveness	Index	by	OECD,	concluded	Bilateral	 Investment	Treaties	(BITs),	 launched	claims	under	Investment	State	Dispute	Settlement	procedure,	(ISDS),	Doing	Business	ranks,	“business	impact	 of	 rules	 on	 FDI”	 index	 by	 Global	 Competitiveness	 Report	 and	 indicators	 of	discriminatory	 measures	 reported	 by	 Global	 Trade	 Alert	 (that	 provides	 up	 to	 date	information	 on	 State	 measures	 likely	 to	 affect	 foreign	 commerce).	 These	 elements	inform	either	about	the	progress	in	reforms	launched,	international	openness/closeness	or	 observance	 of	 the	 existing	 anti-discriminatory	 law.	 Götz	 (2016)	 presented	 data	 for	2015,	in	Table	4	we	show	the	results	for	2016.	
                                                61http://www.novinky.cz/ekonomika/420872-nemecky-bosch-dostane-v-cesku-pobidku-az-444-milionu-na-rozsireni-vyroby.html		
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 Table	4:	Major	international	indicators	concerning	FDI	policy	
2016	 Poland	 Czech	R	 Slovak	R	 Hungary	GCR62	 4.6	 5.3	 5.5	 5.1	DB63	 24	 27	 33	 41	GTA	cases	 2	 1	 0	 1	IRR64	 0.072	 0.010	 0.049	 0.029	ISDS65	 23	 34	 13	 14	BIT66	 68	 113	 58	 60	Indicators	based	on	the	concept	of	Götz	(2016)	updated	from	the	relevant	sources	
	 According	 to	 the	 Global	 Trade	 Alert	 Slovakia	 has	 not	 applied	 discriminatory	investment	measures	after	2008.	Global	Trade	Alert	 lists	one	harmful	 law	amendment	initiated	 by	 Hungarian	 government:	 the	 ban	 on	 foreign	 land	 ownership	 (18.12.2012)	and	 one	 by	 the	 Czech	 government:	 revision	 of	 the	 Act	 on	 investment	 incentives	(01.05.2015).	 In	 Poland	 such	 discriminatory	 law	 was	 the	 “Corporate	 income	 tax	exemption	 for	 foreign	 investment	 and	 pension	 funds”	 (25.11.2010)	 and	 the	 law	"protecting	strategic	Polish	companies	from	hostile	takeovers"	(15.08.2015).	The	total	number	of	ISDS	cases	has	increased	in	every	country	since	2008,	being	quite	high	 for	 the	Czech	Republic.	According	 to	 the	GCR	subindex	on	FDI	attractiveness,	 the	4.5-5.5	value	for	the	V4	economies	are	around	the	EU	average	(the	best	is	of	Ireland	with	6.4)	and	improved	somewhat	from	2015.	The	number	of	BITs	are	especially	high	in	the	case	of	the	Czech	Republic	and	the	investment	regulatory	restrictiveness	index	is	rather	high	in	Slovakia.	Apart	from	these	indices	and	rankings	there	are	some	other	areas	that	influence	the	functioning	 (investment	 and	 trade)	 of	 the	 firms.	 In	 the	 following	 we	 use	 some	 other	international	 indicators	 and	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the	 European	 Commission	 (Country	Reports	2017)	on	these	countries’	progress.	
                                                
62 https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2016-2017-1 
63 http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings 
64 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=FDIINDEX# 
65 http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry 
66 https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Database.aspx#a42 
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Legal	system,	regulations,	corruption	Legal	uncertainty	can	be	harmful	for	investment.	Predictability	of	regulatory,	and	tax	policies,	well	functioning	institutions	are	important.	Corruption	in	general	decreases	transparency	and	increases	inefficiency	in	allocation	of	financial	resources.	In	Poland	 the	EU	Country	Report	warns	on	 legal	uncertainty.	The	Polish	 tax	system	(including	VAT,	CIT,	excise	duties	and	others)	underwent	many	rapid	changes	 in	2016	increasing	uncertainty	about	the	stability	and	credibility	of	the	Polish	tax	system,	given	that	 changes	 are	 often	 introduced	 quickly	 and	 without	 broad	 consultations.	 In	 2016,	policy	 instability	became	 the	 third	most	problematic	 factor	 for	doing	business,	 from	a	previous	 ranking	 of	 10th.	 The	 ease	 of	 doing	 business	 in	 Poland	 has	 been	 however	gradually	 improving.	This	 is	mainly	due	to	the	 introduction	of	the	new	insolvency	law,	faster	 procedures	 for	 property	 registration,	 and	 amendments	 to	 the	 construction	 law.	The	government	has	plans	to	further	simplify	certain	business	procedures	with	a	range	of	proposals	put	forward	within	the	“Strategy	for	Responsible	Development”.	The	Czech	authorities	are	planning	to	introduce	some	steps	to	simplify	the	tax	system	(integrated	 tax	 and	 social	 security	 administration,	 greater	 digitalisation	 of	 the	 tax	administration).	Corruption	in	the	Czech	Republic	continues	to	be	a	major	problem.	The	business	 environment	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	 heavy	 regulatory	 burden	 and	 numerous	administrative	 barriers.	 Recently	 a	 large	 number	 of	 simplification	 measures	 were	implemented.	 Public	 investment	 is	 hampered	 by	 inefficient	 public	 procurement	procedures.	While	 the	 Czech	 authorities	 have	 adopted	 some	 reforms,	 progress	 is	 still	lacking	in	areas	such	as	centralised	purchasing	and	the	incidence	of	corruption	in	public	tender	procedures.	Regarding	Hungary	 international	 indicators	point	 to	a	 low	and	deteriorating	quality	of	 institutions,	mainly	since	2010.	 	As	the	Country	Report	argues,	policy	uncertainty	 is	one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 barriers	 to	 doing	 business	 in	 Hungary.	 For	 government	initiated	proposals,	consultations	tend	to	be	limited	to	very	short	time	periods,	around	4.5	 days	 in	 the	 last	 three	 years.	 Transition	 periods	 allowing	 the	 affected	 parties	 to	prepare	 for	policy	 implementation	are	often	 inadequate.	 In	2011	 the	personal	 income	tax	was	replaced	by	a	flat	rate	of	16%	and	the	corporate	income	tax	was	reduced	to	10%	on	revenues	below	HUF	500	million.	On	the	other	side,	VAT	rate	rose	and	sector	specific	
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 taxes	were	 introduced.	Moreover,	welfare	benefits	were	cut	and	government	spending	on	 education	 and	 infrastructure	 decreased	 (Šćepanović,	 2015).	 The	 tax	 burden	 on	labour	 income	still	 remained	 substantial	because	of	high	 social	 security	 contributions.	Revenues	 from	 sector-specific	 taxes	 were	 estimated	 at	 about	 1.5	 %	 of	 GDP	 in	 2016,	including	 banking,	 insurance,	 utilities,	 energy,	 telecommunication	 and	 retail	 sectors.	From	 January	2017	 the	general	 corporate	 income	 tax	 rate	was	 lowered	 to	9%	 (for	 all	revenues),	mostly	benefiting	large	companies.	This	lowest	corporate	income	tax	rate	in	the	EU	will	improve	Hungary's	competiveness,	and	also	make	it	more	attractive	for	tax	optimisation	purposes	by	foreign	companies.	The	complexity	of	the	tax	system	generates	important	administrative	and	compliance	costs,	 that	 hit	 particularly	 SMEs.	 Public	 procurement	 consistently	 suffers	 from	 limited	competition	 and	 transparency.	 Single-bid	 contract	 awards	 and	 negotiated	 procedures	without	 prior	 publication	 of	 the	 tender	 have	 been	more	 extensively	 used	 in	 Hungary	than	in	most	other	Member	States.	Based	on	the	Transparency	International	corruption	perception	index	(CPI),	Hungary's	score	has	continued	to	deteriorate	over	the	past	few	years	(see	table	5).	In	 Slovakia	 administrative	 and	 regulatory	 barriers	 continue	 to	 be	 significant,	 the	process	of	setting	up	and	running	a	business	in	Slovakia	remains	relatively	complicated.	However,	 tax	 compliance	 costs	 for	 businesses	 have	 declined	 and	measures	 are	 being	taken	 to	 improve	 the	 business	 environment	 and	 foster	 entrepreneurship.	 Weakness	persists	 in	 the	 public	 procurement	 system	 and	 limits	 the	 competition.	 The	 level	 of	perceived	 corruption	 remains	 high	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 anti-corruption	 strategies	 is	limited	 by	 institutional	 shortcomings.	 These	 factors	 discourage	 smaller	 foreign	companies	from	investing	in	Slovakia	and	affect	investment	decisions	of	local	SMEs.	The	Slovak	taxation	framework	has	been	changed	several	times.	The	up	till	then	flat	19%	rate	corporate	income	tax	was	raised	to	23%	in	2013	and	later	reduced	to	22%	and	in	 2017	 to	 21%.	 The	 tightening	 of	 tax	 rules	 brought	 additional	 corporate	 income	 tax	revenue.	However,	over	half	of	all	companies	do	not	pay	this	tax	because	of	exemption	or	 declared	 losses	 (Country	 Report).	 For	 2017,	 the	 government	 has	 extended	 and	increased	 the	 levy	 on	 companies	 in	 regulated	 industries.	 The	 bank	 levy	 that	 had	 also	been	set	to	expire	was	extended	until	2020.	
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Infrastructure	The	Czech	Republic	continues	to	perform	below	the	EU	averages	regarding	transport	infrastructure.	The	quality	of	the	road	network	remains	relatively	low67.	The	density	of	the	rail	network	is	very	high	but	the	network	requires	substantial	modernisation.	There	is	also	a	lack	of	high-speed	railway	connections,	and	cross-border	connections	are	poor.		Investment	in	transport	infrastructure	has	been	inadequate	in	recent	years,	particularly	for	 the	road	network.	 Investment	 in	 transport	 infrastructure	also	suffers	 from	general	problems	related	to	public	procurement	transparency	and	corruption68.	In	Slovakia	 the	 fragmented	 road	 transport	network	harms	 investment,	 especially	 in	the	Central	and	Eastern	regions,	and	aggravates	 the	regional	economic	divide.	Foreign	direct	 investment	 inflows	 tend	 to	 concentrate	 around	 Bratislava,	 while	 Central	 and	Eastern	regions	attract	much	less	domestic	or	foreign	investment.	Road	density	is	low	in	comparison	 to	 EU	 and	 congestion	 levels	 and	 average	 delays	 are	 significant.	 While	motorways	 and	 expressways	 are	 usually	 in	 good	 condition,	 the	 country	 still	 lacks	 a	continuous	motorway	 along	 the	 Bratislava-Kosice	 corridor	 and	 an	 upgraded	 rail	 link.	Slovakia’s	 ageing	 rail	 network	 restricts	 train	 speed,	 while	 various	 lines	 appear	 to	 be	virtually	 obsolete	 in	 view	 of	 the	 very	 low	 frequency	 of	 trains	 and	 small	 or	 inexistent	passenger	volumes.	
Poland	 has	been	 rapidly	 improving	 its	 infrastructure	with	 the	help	of	EU	 funding69,	but	key	structural	bottlenecks	persist.	The	road	fatality	rate	is	still	among	the	highest	in	the	 EU.	 The	 railway	 sector	 continues	 to	 face	 challenges	 and	 bottlenecks	 in	 project	implementation.	Significant	agglomeration	railway	lines	are	still	awaiting	modernisation	to	allow	more	passenger	traffic.	Rail	freight	remains	uncompetitive.	Cumbersome	legal,	financial	 and	 administrative	 procedures	 linked	 with	 bottlenecks	 within	 the	 railway	infrastructure	 manager	 still	 persist	 and	 lead	 to	 project	 delays	 and	 insufficient	
                                                
67 The motorway network density was 9.8 km per 1 000 km2 in 2014 compared to an EU average of 16.8 km. 
68 Road construction is especially problematic in this regard, with many projects exceeding the initial budget 
specified in the tender, experiencing significant delays in completion or being of questionable quality and 
safety. Indeed, deadline extensions for motorway and other infrastructure projects often reach up to seven 
years, and projects are often changed to include additional works after the contracts are signed, resulting in 
considerable extra costs. To simplify and accelerate the procedure for granting building permits, the Czech 
government approved an amendment to the Construction Act and related legislation in September 2016. 
69 In 2015-2016, 115.8 km of new or modernised motorways and expressways were built. The EU funds 
allocation for Polish roads in 2014-2020 is EUR 15 billion. 
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 investment.	 	 Improving	 Poland's	 air	 quality,	 currently	 among	 the	 worst	 in	 the	 EU,	remains	a	major	challenge.		
 
Table 5. Factors of business environment in the Visegrád countries 
 
 Poland Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary 
Transport 
infrastructure 
improving but key 
bottlenecks, large 
fatality rate 
high rail density, 
inadequate road 
network 
fragmented road 
transport network 
improved air 
transport, but rail 
system 
underdeveloped 
TEN-T road 
TEN-T rail core 
network  
34% 
23% 
55% 
63% 
39% 
20% 
81% 
9% 
Legal, 
regulatory 
environment 
The current  
systemic threat to 
the rule of law 
creates legal 
uncertainty. 
Heavy regulatory 
burden and 
administrative 
barriers, but 
improving 
Harmful 
administrative 
and regulatory 
barriers, 
corruption 
Legal uncertainty, 
changing taxes, 
deteriorating 
institutions, 
corruption 
Corruption improving CPI=62 
stagnating 
recently CPI=55 
stagnating 
recently CPI=51 
worsening 
CPI=48 
Education Improving, good Relatively good Deteriorating Significantly worsening results  
PISA 2015 
PIAAC 2015 
501,504,506 
267,260,19 
493,492,487 
274,276,29 
461,475,453 
274,276,28 
477,477, 472 
n.a 
Vocational 
educational 
training (VET) 
Relatively good 
results 
Relatively good 
outcomes, 
positive 
perception 
In 2015 
introduced a dual 
VET system, but 
interest among 
potential 
participants 
remains limited. 
Secondary school 
types were 
renamed in 2016, 
unlikely 
improvement in 
basic skills and 
competencies.  
Skilled labour 
force 
relatively good available, good shortage shortage 
GERD/GDP 
2015* 
1.0% 1.95% 1.18% 1.38% Source:	EU	Commission	Country	Reports	and	
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/ 
http://www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/ 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-fundings/scoreboard_en *Gross	domestic	expenditure	on	R&D,	%,	source	Eurostat70			 In	Hungary	ratings	of	the	quality	of	the	Hungarian	transport	infrastructure	are	below	EU	average	 for	all	modes	of	 transport,	with	however	a	clear	positive	 trend	concerning	air	 transport	 infrastructure.	 Both	 conventional	 and	 high-speed	 rail	 need	 more	
                                                70	http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=t2020_20&plugin=1	
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 development,	 such	 as	 (sub)	 urban	 connections	 and	 regional	 connectivity.	 As	 regards	the	completion	 of	 the	 TEN-T	 Core	 Network,	 the	 Hungarian	 road	 network	 is	 81%	complete,	but	rail	network	only	at	9%	(table	5).	
Education,	training,	R&D	Educational	 performance	 (basic	 skills)	 in	 Poland	 has	 remained	 strong	 over	 recent	years	in	comparison	to	other	EU	countries.	The	school	system	however,	is	changed	from	September	2017	onwards	phasing	out	lower	secondary	schools,	practically	returning	to	the	 pre-1999	 structure.	 Participation	 in	 early	 childhood	 education	 and	 care	 has	increased	but	challenges	remain	in	quality	and	inequalities	of	access.	At	present,	all	four-	and	five-year-olds	are	entitled	to	a	preschool	place	and	from	September	2017	this	right	will	 also	 be	 extended	 to	 three-year-olds.	 Abolishing	 the	 preschool	 obligation	 for	 five-year-olds	may	weaken	the	educational	chances	of	children	from	socially	disadvantaged	backgrounds	according	to	the	Country	Report.	Vocational	education	and	training	(VET)	often	does	not	provide	students	with	basic	skills	 and	 key	 competencies.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 results	 for	 technical	 secondary	schools	are	considerably	better	than	for	basic	vocational	schools.	Employment	rates	of	recent	 vocational	 school	 graduates	 were	 still	 slightly	 below	 the	 EU	 average	 in	 2015.	Weak	 links	 between	 academia	 and	 the	 business	 sector	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 science	 are	crucial	barriers	to	e.g.	the	development	of	in-house	R&D	activities	and	for	investment	in	knowledge-intensive	 areas.	 The	 government	 has	 launched	 a	 revision	 of	 the	 legislative	R&D	framework.	In	the	Czech	Republic	the	implementation	of	reform	measures	aimed	at	improving	the	inclusiveness	 of	 compulsory	 education	 started	 in	 2016.	 The	 reform	 aims	 at	 gradually	increasing	the	participation	of	children	with	special	needs	in	mainstream	education,	by	granting	 them	 a	 legal	 right	 to	 individual	 support	measures.	 Only	 a	 limited	 number	 of	pupils	have	benefited	from	the	reform	to	date.	The	reform	is	largely	co-financed	by	EU	funds.	Ensuring	a	good	understanding	among	the	wider	public	on	the	societal	benefits	of	inclusive	 education	 is	 also	 essential.	 Low	 labour	 market	 relevance	 of	 vocational	education	 and	 training	 is	 criticised	 by	 some	 employers.	 However,	 the	 employment	outcomes	of	VET	students	are	good,	so	the	macroeconomic	impact	of	the	limitations	is	marginal.	The	current	plans	for	further	involvement	of	employers	in	designing	curricula	
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 and	increasing	the	number	of	apprenticeships	(supported	by	the	European	Social	Fund)	can	help	strengthen	links	between	education	and	the	labour	market.	While	total	investment	in	R&D	is	at	the	EU	average,	this	is	largely	driven	by	the	public	sector,	 EU	 funds	 and	 large,	 foreign-owned	 enterprises.	 R&D	 intensity	 has	 increased	significantly	in	recent	years,	reaching	1.95	%	of	GDP	in	2015,	nearly	at	par	with	the	EU	average	 of	 2	%	 but	 this	 is	 not	 being	matched	 by	 corresponding	 improvements	 in	 the	quality	 of	 outcomes.	 While	 progress	 has	 been	 made,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 still	 fares	significantly	below	the	average	EU	performance	in	terms	of	openness	and	excellence	of	its	research	system	and	intellectual	assets.	In	Hungary	 labour	shortage	in	both	skilled	and	unskilled	categories	is	deemed	to	be	the	most	important	investment	barrier	in	Hungary	as	stated	by	company	managers.	The	2015	 PISA	 survey	 of	 educational	 systems	 showed	 significantly	 worsening	 results	 for	Hungary	and	a	very	high	impact	of	the	socio-economic	status	on	students’	performance.	Performance	 in	reading	and	science	worsened	significantly	compared	 to	2012.	Results	remained	stable,	but	low,	in	mathematics.	Hungary	saw	the	one	of	the	highest	increase	in	 the	EU	 in	 the	 share	of	 low	achievers	 in	 science.	The	 reduction	of	 teaching	hours	of	science	subjects	in	vocational	grammar	schools	since	2016	is	likely	to	amplify	Hungary’s	bottleneck	 in	 science	 skills.	 The	 growing	 demand	 for	 highly-skilled	 workforce	 is	 not	matched	 by	 a	 sufficiently	 large	 pool	 of	 applicants	 to	 tertiary	 education	 and	 adequate	completion	rates.	A	recent	reform	has	changed	the	structure	of	vocational	education	and	training.	The	different	secondary	school	types	were	renamed	in	2016	with	the	intention	to	 make	 vocational	 education	 more	 attractive.	 However,	 the	 revised	 curricula	 seem	unlikely	 to	 lead	 to	 an	 improvement	 in	 basic	 skills.	 The	 proportion	 of	 VET	 students	 in	work-based	learning	is	one	of	the	highest	in	Europe	(about	70%).	Adult	participation	in	life-long	learning	has	increased	but	remains	below	the	EU	average.	Total	spending	on	R&D	increased	in	recent	years,	but	public	R&D	intensity	is	falling.	Although	 R&D	 spending	 in	 the	 business	 sector	 is	 still	 below	 the	 EU	 average,	 it	 has	doubled	as	a	percentage	of	GDP	over	the	past	ten	years.	However,	business	innovation	is	highly	 concentrated	 in	a	handful	of	 large	 foreign-owned	companies.	At	 the	 same	 time,	public	 R&D	 has	 been	 decreasing.	 This	 weakens	 the	 science	 base	 which	 provides	 the	knowledge	 and	 human	 resources	 for	 business	 development.	 The	 low	 quality	 of	 the	
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 public	research	and	innovation	system	contributes	to	insufficient	cooperation	between	higher	education	institutions,	public	research	organisations.	In	Slovakia	 the	 low	access	 to	 life-long	 learning	 and	 the	weak	 responsiveness	of	 the	educational	 system	 to	 labour	 market	 needs	 translates	 into	 skills	 shortages	 that	 hold	back	growth	and	employment.	Educational	outcomes	are	weak	and	inequalities	appear	high	 in	 an	 international	 comparison.	 Inadequate	 teacher	 education	 and	 remuneration,	low	participation	in	early	childhood	education	and	low	inclusion	of	marginalized	groups,	especially	 the	 Roma	 population,	 have	 all	 contributed	 to	 the	 deterioration	 of	 the	educational	 system.	 Tertiary	 education	 attainment	 has	 stagnated	 at	 a	 low	 level	 and	measures	to	improve	quality	are	proving	insufficient.	In	2008/9	a	vocational	training	reform	was	launched.	In	2015	Slovakia	introduced	a	dual	 vocational	 education	 training	 system,	 but	 interest	 among	 potential	 participants	remains	limited.	In	the	Automotive	Suppliers	Survey	in	Slovakia71		almost	three	fifths	of	respondents	stated	that	their	participation	in	the	dual	education	system	is	hindered	by	a	lack	of	internal	sources,	i.e.	materials	and	professional	teachers.	Firms	are	not	confident	about	 whether	 the	 graduates	 of	 the	 dual	 program	 will	 remain	 with	 the	 firm	 after	graduation.	 Even	 the	 optimists	 expect	 that	 improvements	 to	 the	numbers	 of	 potential	hires	with	practical	experience	will	not	be	seen	for	at	least	3	years.	
                                                
71  Automotive Suppliers Survey, Slovakia 2015. https://www.pwc.com/sk/en/odvetvia/automobilovy-
priemysel/assets/automotive-suppliers-survey-2015.pdf  
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 Table	6.	Qualification	of	labour	force	characteristics	by	German	investors		
  HU	 CZ	 SK	 PL	Cost	 2015 2,83 3,21 2,77 3,1 	 2016 2,83 3,01 2,91 3,1 	 2017 2,98 2,90 2,95 3,12 Productivity	 2015 2,59 3,34 2,41 3,6 	 2016 2,63 3,23 2,60 3,6 	 2017 2,85 3,15 2,61 3,6 Qualification	 2015 2,58 n.a 2,55 3,8 	 2016 2,66 3,15 2,90 3,9 	 2017 2,84 2,91 2,77 3,66 Academic	Formation	 2015 2,82 3,17 3,09 3,7 	 2016 2,89 3,09 3,2 3,7 	 2017 2,88 3,02 3,37 3,6 Vocational	Training	system	 2015 3,32 n.a 3,52 2,8 	 2016 3,43 2,53 3,51 2,9 	 2017 3,41 2,36 3,70 2,67 Available	skilled	workforce	 2015 3,26 n.a 3,29 3,3 
 2016 3,56 2,12 3,54 3,20 
 2017 3,94 1,8 3,78 2,89 Source:	Various	surveys	of	German	chambers	(Konjunkturbericht)	in	the	given	countries		 The	education	and	training	problems	and	emigration	had	 led	 to	problems	 in	skilled	labour	supply	and	will	lead	to	even	more	serious	shortage.	The	situation	seems	to	be	the	most	critical	in	Slovakia	and	in	Hungary.		In	Slovakia	two-thirds	of	automotive	supplier	firms	 expect	 they	will	 need	 a	 double-digit	 increase	 in	 staff	 numbers	 and	 four	 fifths	 of	respondents	 considered	 quality	 of	 labour	 to	 be	 a	 factor	 limiting	 production	development.	Shortage	of	workforce	pushes	up	wages,	mainly	in	the	automotive	sector.	(The	recruitment	announcement	of	the	new	Jaguar	factory	immediately	raised	wages	at	KIA	and	PSA72.)	According	to	the	survey	of	the	German-Slovak	Chamber	the	satisfaction	of	German	investors	concerning	qualified	workforce	deteriorated	most	in	the	past	three	years	 among	 all	 factors73.	 This	 deterioration	 is	 even	 worse	 in	 Hungary.74	 As	 for	 the	
                                                72http://www.kisalfold.hu/kulfold_hirek/jol_jarnak_a_szlovak_autogyarakban_dolgozok_a_jaguar_land_rover_erkezesevel/2512399/	73http://www.dsihk.sk/fileadmin/ahk_slowakei/Dokumente/Presse/Ergebnisse_Konjunkturumfrage_2017.pdf		74	The	director	of	Mercedes	factory	admitted	that	the	most	urgent	problem	of	the	Hungarian	automotive	sector	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 labour	 force,	 because	 the	 new	Mercedes	 factory	 extension	 requires	 2500	 jobs.	Education	is	essential,	therefore	the	multinational	firm	founds	a	new	education	center	until	September	2018.	http://www.portfolio.hu/vallalatok/cegauto/itt_az_ujabb_rekord_mindent_kipreseltek_a_kecskemeti_mercedes-gyarbol.248887.html		
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 survey	 is	 made	 yearly	 in	 all	 countries,	 we	 can	 have	 some	 comparative	 picture	 from	German	 investors’	 point	 of	 view	 (see	 table	 6).	 By	 far	 the	 best	 position	 belongs	 to	 the	Czech	Republic	regarding	the	availability	of	skilled	labour	force	and	vocational	training.	This	 also	 adds	 to	 the	 good	 comparative	 position	 of	 the	 Czech	Republic	within	Central	Europe.75	The	country	is	geographically	close	to	Germany,	has	flexible	labour	force	and	highly	competitive	factories.	Apart	from	that,	-	as	Ismaili	et	al	(2016)	write	-	“the	country	has	had	a	highly	involved	and	committed	government	and	strong	industry	associations,	which	together	worked	to	build	an	extensive	and	robust	value	chain	and	strong	ties	with	neighbouring	partners”.	The	Czech	Republic	was	ranked	as	the	world’s	leading	location	for	automotive-component	plants	for	three	consecutive	years.		
Conclusion	
	Foreign	investment	promotion	had	been	important	in	the	Visegrád	countries	during	the	 transition	 process.	 We	 can	 distinguish	 investment	 promotion	 in	 a	 narrow	 sense	(grants,	subsidies,	tax	allowances)	and	in	a	wide	sense	(general	business	environment).	Incentives	 in	 a	 narrow	 sense	 seemingly	 hurt	 EU	 rules	 of	 competition	 but	 can	 be	well	arranged	as	regional	development	aim.	Grants	and	tax	allowances	have	attracted	foreign	investors	to	the	Visegrád	area	and	their	production	facilities	have	increased	the	export	of	the	countries	significantly.	With	 somewhat	 different	 regulation	but	 in	 all	 four	 countries	we	 find	 special	 zones,	that	 are	made	 attractive	 for	 investors.	 Automotive	 clusters,	 agglomerations,	 industrial	parks	are	beneficial	for	new	investments,	suppliers	or	capacity	extensions.	However,	for	example	in	Slovakia,	despite	the	auto	industry–related	growth,	the	unequal	development	and	income	between	the	Bratislava	city-region	and	the	automotive	cluster	regions	in	the	area	has	not	changed	much	in	the	past	decades	(Jacobs,	2017).	Wider	 incentives,	 general	 business	 environment	 and	 policies	 are	 important	 for	 all	firms	 (be	 small,	 large,	 foreign	 or	 domestic).	 Apart	 from	 proper	 administration,	infrastructure	 and	 taxation,	 availability	 of	 skilled	 workers	 is	 essential	 for	 investors.	
                                                75	 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-28/in-a-bad-neighborhood-the-czech-republic-becomes-investor-haven	
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 However,	 for	 today	 the	education	and	 training	problems	and	emigration	have	 led	and	will	 lead	 to	 serious	problems	 in	 skilled	 labour	supply	 in	 the	Visegrád	economies	most	critically	in	Slovakia	and	in	Hungary.	 	Shortage	of	workforce	pushes	up	wages	that	will	make	labour	more	expensive.	Legal	stability	has	shaken	in	Hungary	and	Poland,	corruption	is	also	high	in	Slovakia	and	 the	 Czech	 Republic.	 Visegrád	 countries	 compete	 for	 large	 investments,	 therefore	grants	for	foreign	firms	(narrow	incentives)	will	be	more	and	more	important.	However,	this	 can	be	 true	on	 the	 short	 run	but	 cannot	 endlessly	 compensate	 for	 the	mentioned	worsening	business	climate,	that	is	promotion	in	wide	sense.	The	reason	for	this	 is	that	the	choice	of	 location	for	an	investment	is	not	a	one-step	process	and	 incentives	 in	a	narrow	sense	can	only	play	a	role	 if	general	economic	and	legal	environment	of	the	country	is	favourable.	As	Oman	(2000;	10)	writes:	“the	decision	is	normally	a	two-stage	(or	multi-stage)	process	in	which	investors	first	draw	up	a	short	list	 of	 acceptable	 sites	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 ‘fundamentals’	 of	alternative	sites,	 largely	irrespective	of	the	availability	of	fiscal	and	financial	incentives	from	potential	host	governments,	and	only	 later,	….	do	investors	consider	—	and	often	seek	out	—	investment	incentives.”	Nunnenkamp	(2001,	1)	also	states	that	“promotional	efforts	will	help	little	to	attract	FDI	if	economic	fundamentals	are	not	conducive	to	FDI.	Fiscal	 and	 financial	 incentives	 offered	 to	 foreign	 investors	 may	 do	 more	 harm	 than	good.”	As	our	paper	showed,	grants	to	investors	are	expensive.	The	cost	of	one	job	in	certain	cases	is	extremely	high.	Even	if	a	part	of	these	grants	is	financed	from	EU	Funds,	this	is	public	money	 that	 could	have	been	efficiently	 spent,	 better	 allocated.	 Support	of	 large	foreign	investors	may	also	discriminate	smaller	local	investors.	Apart	from	direct	costs	for	 the	 government	 and	 citizens	 subsidies	 for	 foreign	 investors	 are	 mostly	 not	transparent.	Secret	deals	create	possibilities	for	corruption	and	rent-seeking	behaviour,	working	 against	 competitive	 markets,	 sound	 policy-making	 and	 accountable	government	(Oman,	2000).	While	governments	often	“justify”	providing	 investment	 incentives	with	the	need	to	develop	 poorer	 areas,	 in	 practice	 incentives	 are	 often	 of	 limited	 effectiveness	 in	 this	regard	 (Oman,	 2000,	 Jacobs,	 2017).	 Created	 jobs	mostly	 do	 not	 require	 high	 skills.	 In	
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 certain	cases	industrial	parks	can	even	harm	the	environment	or	meet	the	opposition	of	local	land	owners	(as	the	example	of	the	Czech	Hyundai	and	LG	Phillips	factory	shows).	Despite	 this,	 states	 are	 partners	 of	 the	 investors	 and	 can	 even	 apply	 deceptive	 and	oppressive	patterns	towards	its	citizens	(Bobák,	2011,	Macek,	et	al.,	2007).	Why	 it	 is	 so	 important	 to	 attract	 foreign	 investment	 with	 costly	 narrow-type	incentives	 then?	 Is	 it	 “easier”	 or	 more	 worth	 than	 proper	 wide	 sense	 promotion,	meaning	 stabile	 and	 transparent	 legal	 environment,	 foreseeable	 regulations	 and	 easy	doing	business	conditions?	In	the	case	of	the	Visegrád	countries	our	assumption	is	that	yes,	attracting	FDI	with	tailor-made	supports	will	be	important	for	the	governments	in	the	near	future.	The	reasons	for	this	are	that	these	economies	are	highly	dependent	on	foreign	capital	with	not	much	domestic	productive	capital	and	this	marks	a	path.	Apart	from	 that	 narrow-type	 incentives	 can	 suit	 better	 the	 “style”	 and	 aims	 of	 the	 present	political	 governing	 elite.	 We	 should	 not	 forget	 that	 legal	 stability	 has	 shaken	 and	corruption	has	 increased	 in	 these	 countries	 in	 the	past	 years.	Bargaining	with	 foreign	multinationals	fits	into	this	picture.	
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